United Nations Peace Support Operations and Security in South Sudan (2011-2018)

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Abstract: *The security problem in South Sudan persists irrespective of the huge human and material resources deployed by the United Nations and other NGOs to bring peace and security to the country since December 2013, when the conflict erupted. The security situation has left about 382,000 people killed, with rising human rights abuses, rape of women and children, ethnic cleansing, and armed robbery. The main objective of this study was to examine the extent to which United Nations intervention in South Sudan, through UNMISS has affected the country and the pursuit of peace and security. The qualitative research method was adopted for this study, using the cross-sectional design, and snowball sampling technique to identify 28 suitable respondents for in-depth interviews. The thematic and content analysis methods were used to interpret the secondary and primary data generated. Findings showed that the security problem in South Sudan is characterized by natural causes like climate change, and man-made issues such as political instability, struggle over power- leading to high presence of illegal weapons, ethnocentric crimes, and human rights abuses. United Nations through UNMISS are making efforts to restore peace and security in South Sudan; some of the strategies adopted include provision of PoC camps for safety and welfare of IDPs, monitoring of human rights violations, mediations, and capacity building. The study also identified challenges hampering UNMISS effective intervention, and recommended increase funding and support for the mission. The international community and governments of interest (including GoSS) should collapse their self interests and support the UN mission to achieve peace and security. UN should also look inward to strengthen its internal coordination and communication, maintain neutrality; exhibit willpower to implement 'use of force' enshrined in chapter VII of its mandate; and intensify disarmament programs. By these, peace and security would be achieved quickly in South Sudan.*

Keywords: *United Nations, Peace Support Operations and Security*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background to the Study

The security challenges experienced by nations of the world in recent years are on the increase. Countries are facing one security challenge or the other, with some of these countries almost on the brink of failed states. These security challenges have a variety of causes: some are caused by natural disasters, while some are developed and nurtured by human insensitivity, greed and selfishness. The concept of security around the world has also evolved over the years, encompassing food security, environmental security, health security, security of lives and property, and economic security, most of them tagged as "human security". Despite mitigating efforts by the UN, Governments, NGOs and other intervening agencies, the struggle over insecurity continues with ample hope for more secure societies around the world. The issue of insecurity continues to be a major challenge considering the effects of global warming, incessant earthquakes and insurgency most especially in Africa, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), attacks in Syria, Europe and America, Xenophobic attacks in South Africa, conflicts in the Sudanese region and the global economic crisis stressing states' resources, one cannot help but wonder where then is "secured" in the world today.

South Sudan presents another of such security problems; considering its nature and pattern, the situation in South Sudan brings to the fore the magnitude of security challenges faced within the East African region. The South Sudanese security challenges stretch across the broad spectrum of insecurity, which are either natural or man-made, or one complementing the other. South Sudan's background of violence and insecurity is fundamentally related to series of conflicts surrounding their existence under the one

state Sudan, and the confronting challenges which precipitated their independence as a nation. South Susan's history is clouded by series of conflicts (UNMIS Report, 2010).

South Sudan secured her independence from Sudan in 2011 after four decades of brutal civil war that left two and a half million people dead, and over five million externally displaced (Momodu, 2018). The devastated and vastly underdeveloped southern Sudanese nation came into existence amid great challenges and resistance from Sudan. The Referendum in 2011 in which South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted in favor of secession gave birth to the world's youngest country (BBC News, 2011). Secession from Sudan in 2011 marked a major milestone and a fresh opportunity for the South Sudanese people; but massive state corruption (AUCISS Report, 2014), political instability within the ruling party of Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); and persistent tension over the sharing of oil revenues left South Sudan deeply vulnerable to renewed conflict which poses both internal and external security challenges within the region (International Crisis Group, 2015).

South Sudan's current capital is Juba, which is also its largest city; it is bordered by the Republic of Sudan to the north, Ethiopia to the east, Kenya to the southeast, Uganda to the south, the Democratic Republic of Congo to the southwest, and the Central African Republic to the west with a population of over 13.8 million people (Country meters, 2018). South Sudan is divided into 3 regions of Bahr el Ghazal (Northwest), Equatoria (Southern) and Greater Upper Nile (Northeast). It originally had the original 10 States at independence, but is presently divided into 32 states and 180 counties (Gurtong, 2018). These newly created states are however subject to controversy.Mr. Salva Kiir Mayardit assumed the Presidency of the Republic of South Sudan since her independence in 2011; prior to independence, Mr. Kiir was President of Government of South Sudan, as well as First Vice President of Sudan, from 2005 to 2011 (ICG, 2015).

Since independence, the country has been plagued with lack of development, bad governance, rampant corruption, ethnic tension, and human rights violations (ICG, 2015). In July 2013, only two years of independence, South Sudan was thrown into political turmoil when President Salva Kiir Mayardit sacked his entire cabinet in December 2013; accusing his political opponents led by his Vice President, Riek Machar, of attempting a military coup against his government leading to ethnic cleansing in Juba, the capital city (BBC News, 2013). Salva Kiir and Riek Macha come from South Sudan's main ethnic groups, the Dinka and Nuer, which have fought over land and resources for years. Their security details engaged in a gun battle, conducted house-to-house searches, targeting and massacring innocent civilians and within days the nation was consumed by war. The fugitive former vice president of South Sudan, Riek Machar led an armed opposition against President Kiir's government (ICG, 2015), refuting any coup attempt and accusing Kiir of employing state power for the illegal purpose of silencing dissenting voices within the ruling SPLM (Maru, 2013).

On June 27 2018, a declaration was signed between Kirr and his former vice Rick Machar, but the ceasefire they agreed on was breached the same day it came into force after different rebel groups rejected a new power-sharing deal proposed (Lear, 2018). The long process of a peace deal which continued back and forth was signed in Sudan on the 5th of August 2018, paving the way for a final peace accord which was later signed in September 2018 (Omonu, 2018). However, the peace deal agreements have not been met hitherto due to deep rooted distrust between the two leaders. The primary cause of fighting in South Sudan remains the continued struggle over power, land and oil (Kock, 2011 and Iaccino, 2016).

International humanitarian experts like Maru (2013) have gone further to attribute the causes of the crisis to lack of willingness to democratize the SPLM, and low levels of delivery of basic services to the South Sudanese public. The oil politics in South Sudan is believed to have contributed negatively to the prolonged conflict as both internal and external factors. As an internal negative factor, Paraskova (2018) and the Sentry report (2018) suggests that oil revenues are used to fund the war in South Sudan, accusing their leaders of illegally getting rich and using the very oil money to terrorize civilians. Similarly, as an external factor, countries such as (not limited to) Malaysia, Russia, USA, India, France and China have interests in South Sudan's oil- the Chinese 'win-win policy' has endured China's economic interest in the country since before independence, making China one of South Sudan's biggest trading friends. China state-own oil company- China National Petroleum Corporation controls about 40% of the two main consortia (Malaysia's PETRONAS and CNPC) in the country (Paraskova, 2018);

China is also reported to be involved in an exchange deal of Chinese-made weapons for South Sudan's crude oil (Manyok, 2016).

The United Nations peace support operations in South Sudan date back to the era of 'one-state Sudan'. The UN has been intervening through her various agencies including the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) established in March 2005, and now the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) established in July 2011 to support the new government after her independence in 2010. The mission objectives are tailored to protect civilians, monitor and investigate human rights violations, support humanitarian assistance, and promote the implementation of peace agreements in the young country. UNMISS and other UN agencies such as World Food Organization (WFO), United Nations Children's Funds (UNICEF) etc are working in South Sudan (UN, 2016).

It is important to note that the severe security challenges faced in South Sudan did not emanate from the current civil war which broke out in 2013. For instance, South Sudan had one of the worst security and humanitarian situations at independence from Sudan; this is largely believed to be connected to a series of civil wars that occurred in the one-state Sudan between the Arab north and the underdeveloped Christian and Animist south from 1955 to 2005 (Roth, 2012). This was compounded by a devastating famine in 1988, and the 1989 coup which brought Omar al-Bashir and his National Islamic Front (NIF) to power, which saw repression in the south increase as the war against South Sudanese rebels became a holy war (jihad) under his rule (Peace Direct, 2017). The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) marked an end to the civil war and ensured the referendum which created South Sudan.

The above highlighted, the 'complex' history of South Sudan, which apparently explained the foundation of its current compounded security and humanitarian challenges that continues to expand. As earlier stressed, South Sudan's security challenges are widely believed to have been exacerbated by either human or natural factors. Some exponents such as David Smith (2014), David Shearer (2017), Michael Morra (2017) and organizations such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and the United Nations (Fakih, 2016; York, 2017; Oxfam, 2014) have described the South Sudanese case as a "man-made disaster" where leaders chose to misuse opportunities to advance common fronts, delivered into their hands at the 2011 independence, rather they battle over power and oil. On the other hand, natural factor such as environmental or climate change challenges has also affected the country, leading to drought and massive hunger and malnutrition. These also facilitate poverty and diseases.

Another factor facilitating insecurity in South Sudan is the presence of illegal weapons. South Sudan is reported to have one of the most armed populations in the world. The proliferation of arms has directly contributed to the violence and instability that have plagued the country for years, Weapons acquisition and transfers continue unabated in South Sudan (Broga, 2016). At independence in 2011, it is believed that 3.2 million weapons were in circulation in South Sudan, two-thirds of which were thought to be in the hands of civilians (Broga, 2016). This explains the speed at which violence spreads at any given opportunity.

All efforts to intervene in the South Sudanese conflict have not yielded expected outcome. Efforts by neighbors, regional and global organizations such as United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), IGAD-plus (which incorporates IGAD plus 12 mediators, the UN, AU, and several non-African governments), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and concerned individuals are yet to put an end to the lingering crisis which is also creating tension within the region (ICG, 2015). The South Sudanese people have benefited from interventions from several NGOs and humanitarian organizations, including UN aid agencies. One intervention organization critical to this study is the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Historically, UNMISS metamorphosed from African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and now United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)- these periods of transition occurred from the period of 'one-state' Sudan.

The UN Security Council resolution 1996 (2011) mandated the establishment of UNMISS in 2011 after South Sudan's independence. The mandate which has been periodically adjusted since its creation was initially designed to support peace consolidation and economic development, prevent conflict and protect civilians, among others. By December 2013, in the wake of the crisis that broke, UN Security Council resolution 2132 (2013) authorized a military component deployment of up to 12,500 troops and a police component of up to 1,323 to South Sudan (UN, 2017). When the conflict got worsened in 2016,

the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2304 (2016), authorizing the expansion of peacekeeping forces and stressing the priority of civilian protection in its mandate; also extends the mandate to December 2016, which would be further extended pending the review of operations in March 2018. While the Government of South Sudan accuses UN of interfering in her sovereignty, non-neutral, and assisting opposition groups, Ki-moon (2015) asserts that the role of UNMISS in South Sudan is arguably a major reason "why" the country has not yet collapsed entirely (UN, 2017).

The number of resources invested so far by the United Nations and other stakeholders in the South Sudan security and humanitarian crises may be difficult to verify because of the massive involvements of aid agencies, and multiple response channels through which the humanitarian crisis is being approached. Aside UN agencies, there are so many other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and religious organizations responding through interventions in the country. However, one consistent variable in this whole struggle for peace and security in South Sudan is the fact that massive efforts have been invested so far, with little result in terms of sustainable peace and security. Scholars, political analysts, and world leaders had hoped that an independent South Sudan would bring lasting peace, security and development in the country and the entire East African region, but that was never so, as the internal conflict continues to linger, multiplying the effect of insecurity and stressing her neighboring states within the region (CARE Report, 2014).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The growing security situation has left about 382,000 people killed since December 2013 (VOA News, 2018), about 4 million people have been displaced, and about 2.5 million having fled to neighboring countries, especially Uganda and Sudan; with rising human rights abuses, rape of women and children, ethnic cleansing, and armed robbery. South Sudan's civil war is fought essentially without rules; all of the factions commit atrocities without concern for human rights. Despite condemnation from the international community, humanitarian and security challenges in and within South Sudan's region are worsened by the continuing internal conflict. Other dimensions of these problems include the protracted effects of environmental challenges such as drought, landmines, food shortage, hunger, malnutrition and outbreaks of diseases (Oxfam, 2015).

Furthermore, the insecurity crises have broken existing supply chains, cutting off market-based commodity flows to several parts of the country. The uncertainty created by this has also deterred investment, both foreign and domestic. In the heat of the conflict that broke in 2013, some of the oil companies were forced to leave the country due to insecurity, plunging oil production and government revenue generation (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2014). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns that the prolonged conflict threatens a complete collapse of the South Sudan economy, as prices of most basic products skyrockets, worsening the situation and exacerbating the food security problem (Lear, 2018).

The six UN protection of civilian (PoC) sites where people have taken refuge are overcrowded, refugees live in dire conditions. There are reports of outbreak of cholera and malnutrition in some of these UN camps (UN News center, 2016); most of the displaced are mainly women and children. As many as 5.5 million people (more than one-third of their population) face food insecurity in South Sudan (ECHO Factsheet, 2017), as the conflict degenerates to sporadic violence, increase in criminality such as armed robberies and hijackings in some urban centers; human rights violation, systematic rape of women and girls as a weapon of war (Aljazeera News 2016, July 28), child soldier recruitments, ethnic cleansing, communal conflicts, herdsmen attack etc. These challenges put together have impacted negatively on South Sudan, hampering peace and development of the young nation (Nyongo, 2013).

Since 2013, the UN has approximately spent $20 billion (Nyadera, 2018) in her bid to contend the security situation in South Sudan. In 2018 alone, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated a sum of $1.72 billion, whereas the sum of $1.6 billion was estimated for 2017, even though only $1.2 billion funding was realized as at December 2017. These estimates does not include that of other aid agencies and NGOs like ICRC, Mercy Corps etc., whose budgets for South Sudan are also extremely high. ICRC spent $130m on food aid to South Sudan in 2016 (Danzi, 2016). These efforts are yet to yield the desired results.

The South Sudanese security challenges seem not to be abating, rather creating tension around the region, overstretching the infrastructure and security of her neighboring countries. The ongoing conflict

continues to destabilize the country politically, and creating ethnocentric tension. Thus, this study seeks to evaluate the nature of South Sudan security problem, the nature of UN peace support operation in the country, and how it has either responded or failed to respond to the security problems, principally through UNMISS interventions between 2013 and 2018, with consideration to existing challenges. As stated earlier, the ongoing conflict in South Sudan broke in December 2013.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided this study:

1. What is the nature of the South Sudanese security problem?
2. What is the nature of the United Nations peace support operation in South Sudan?
3. Are there challenges facing the UN mission (UNMISS) in South Sudan?
4. How have these challenges (if any) affected the work of UNMISS in maintaining peace and security?

Aim and Objectives of the Study

This study aimed at evaluating the extent to which United Nations intervention in South Sudan's conflict through UNMISS, has affected the country and the pursuit of peace and security. The main objective of the study was to examine United Nations Peace Support Operations, UNMISS and Security in South Sudan, 2013-2018.

The specific objectives of the study were:

1. To find out the nature of South Sudanese security problem

2. To evaluate the nature of UN intervention in South Sudan.

3. To identify the challenges faced by UNMISS in South Sudan

4. To discuss the effects of such challenges to UNMISS in maintaining peace and security.

2. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

2.1. Peace Support Operation

Peace Support Operation for this study refers to the United Nations instrument for international conflict management being applied currently in South Sudan; it is a slightly different approach from the regular peacekeeping operations. PSO involves politics undertaken through dialogues and mediations, increases emphases on the protection of civilians and establishment of protective environment, rebuilding the host state's capacities and consolidating rule of law. Significantly, PSO introduces partnership peacekeeping and empowers robust actions by peacekeepers, including the use of force to protect civilians and carry out other responsibilities and functions (UN News, 2016). United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) since 2013, has engaged the PSO approach to intervene in South Sudan's security problem.

2.2. United Nations Mission in South Sudan

This refers to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. For this study, it means the military wing of the United Nations that is deployed by the United Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and security in the conflict zone of South Sudan since 8th July 2011. UNMISS projects the militarized presence of the UN in South Sudan, designed specifically to function only within the country, to bring about peace and security, stability, promote democracy, and protect civilians and human rights. UNMISS is the lead UN agency saddled with the role of providing security for other UN Agencies intervening in South Sudan. It is characterized by personnel, including contingent military troops and police from 73 troop-contributing countries (TCC) across the continents of the world (UN, 2023).

2.3. Security

In social science language "security" is a controversial concept which recently became more concerned with giving high priority to issues of human rights, economics, environment, crimes or social injustice, in addition to its traditional concern with security from external military threats (Baldwin, 1997). There is no one broad consensus about the meaning of security, only depending on people's cultural beliefs, ideas and perceptions of reality, the term 'security' get its different values; this is supported by the important number of definitions of security that have emerged, especially since the end of the Cold War. National security, common security, collective security, shared security, human security or

cooperative security makes a description of what their ideologies consider or understood as security, and how to obtain it. Other terms like sustainable security, as well as other hybrid concepts like "hard power-soft power" or "smart power" have also appeared in more recent years (InstitutoEspanol De Estudios Estrategicos Framework Document, 2011). The concept of Security in the field of International Relations is one of utmost importance as it bothers on the safety of states, citizens and the international system; it deals with armies and wars, and with a broad spectrum and approaches, of which defining the concept is not that simple as there are various understandings of the term security (IEEE Framework Document, 2011).

A simple definition of security means "freedom from danger or threat", generally referring to human, institution or state against criminal activity such as terrorism, theft or espionage. Kurtus (2012) postulates this assertion as he see's security as the "protection of a person, property or organization from attack". Kurtus (2012) further described security as to know the types of possible attacks, to be aware of the motivations for attacks and your relationship to those motives. For Kurtus, the security or defence against such a threat is to make it difficult to attack, threaten counter-measures, or make a pre-emptive attack on a source of threat.

Kurtus definition of security rises fundamentally, questions such as what type of possible attacks require security? What should be done about these threats? What type of defense can be proffered? For this exponent, security is required to protect a person, property or organization from attacks which can come from criminals, persons on our physical or emotional being, attack on organizations, companies, government and countries (Kurtus, 2012). This exposition supports the use of negative force as a means of pre-emptive action against a perceived threat.

The definition discussed above aligns with the traditional concept of security. These centers on state centric security, where it is the soul function and responsibility of the state army to protect state interest, lives and properties of citizens from both internal and external threats? Kurtus' (2012) definition created room enough to accommodate existing threats on a person's physical and emotional being. Worthy to note is that the concept of security in the post-cold war era accommodates all forms of life threatening issues such as economy, food, health, environment etc (Ormeci, 2010). For this study, the aforementioned life threatening issues identified may better justify the security needs in South Sudan considering its dimension and corresponding indices; this will be seen in subsequent sections. While the wide perspective of security regards "everything" as a security matter, the traditional approach focuses mainly or exclusively on military concerns.

Having looked at the definitions and perspectives on security above, it is agreeable that most of them have not really captured the post-cold war concept of security which in essence better explains the current security realities in South Sudan. Hence it is important to discuss the traditional concept of security in order to appreciate the evolution of this all important concept, and also the contemporary views on security to help analyze the realities in South Sudan. It further discuses the ideological base of security to help create required perspective that appreciates the security situation in South Sudan. This will be done through the realist's and liberals thoughts' on security.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Intervention Theory

Intervention theory addresses the question of when it is desirable not to intervene and when it is appropriate to do so. Intervention suggests legitimate or illegitimate interference by a neutral party in an ongoing conflict between two or more parties. According to Argyris (1970), the term intervention means to enter into an ongoing system of relationship, to come between or among persons, groups, or objects for the purpose of helping them. The term intervention is used across a range of social and medical practices, including health care, child protection and law enforcement. For this study, the Intervention theory is used to view the actions and involvement of the United Nations in South Sudan's internal conflict and security problems.

4. METHODOLOGY

Cross-sectional research design was adopted to help prosecute the task. This design was selected because it has the flexibility to accommodate the dynamics in the case study. The design acknowledged differences that exist in the population/participants in terms of sex, status etc. Cross-section is also

suitable for this study because it is capable of using data from a large number of subjects and not geographically bound (University of Southern California Libraries 2016). All of the participants in this research are not located in South Sudan, or in a single location, some of the participants are located outside South Sudan and at other different locations.

5. EMPIRICAL REVIEW

5.1. Nature of the UNMISS Peace Support Operation in South Sudan

This review noted that UNMISS is involved with activities such as policing, justice and democracy, which is believed to be a major reason "why" the country has not yet failed entirely. In response to the conflict, Aleksandrovich (2015) reports that the peacekeeping forces launched integrated campaign, including monitoring, assessment for early warning of civil-population, air and ground patrols, mediation, peace initiatives and support of police forces deployment in conflict affected areas. Furthermore, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan also engages in construction and engineering activities geared at protecting civilians and humanitarian actors. The mission responds to sporadic rising tension within the country, including areas such as South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Jonglei State to take preventive measures and organize political processes, and consultations with public authorities and community to prevent violence (Aleksandrovich, 2015).

Ki-moon (2015) also affirms that UNMISS have conducted nearly 6,000 aircraft rotations, airdropping 100,000 metric tons of food in 2014 (one of the largest humanitarian air operations in the world), cleared 1,600 mines and 20,000 unexploded ordnance in 2015 alone, and released one billion square meters of land to the community since 2004. The mission is also involved in conducting patrols to protect civilians, trained South Sudan National Police Service officers on the functioning of the Emergency Call Center, and also trained journalists on conflict sensitive reporting. UNMISS have also assisted hundreds of thousands refugees from Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Central African Republic with food, water, shelter, health care and basic education in 2015 alone. Ban Ki-moon sees all these efforts by UNMISS as the reason South Sudan state has not failed entirely (Ki-moon, 2015).

The review discovered that UNMISS is also involved in engineering activities, constructing drainages and access way in volatile areas affected by the conflict. Similarly, UNMISS in partnership with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated a project, termed County Support Bases (CSBs) in 28 target Counties across South Sudan. The CSBs are designed to strengthen recovery and development coordination. UNDP Community Security & Arms Control (CSAC) was tasked to deliver these CSBs which would complement facilities through provision of community centers, local government offices, and multi-purpose facilities, as well as provide additional equipment, and material support to strengthen local Government presence and capacity at the county level. The CSBs are structured to create parallel communities within the existing communities in 28 counties across the country, equipped with basic amenities and equipment to compliment government efforts.

UNMISS-UNDP's Community Security & Arms Control (CSAC) project supports the Government of South Sudan's efforts to build social cohesion, stability, peace and security for conflict affected communities in the county. This contributes towards responsive democratic governance, rule of law, improved recovery and development planning in South Sudan. CSAC provides technical and financial support to Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control (BCSSAC), the South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission (SSPRC). The project also provides national platform for peace and reconciliation while improving community security, and strengthens broader post-conflict recovery initiatives (UN Career, 2016).

UNMISS through its original peacekeeping–peace building nexus from 2011, plans to construct and establish 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) within South Sudan, which are facilitating tools intended to support peace consolidation, extension of state authority and the building of national capacities to enable service delivery to rural populations. The aim of the CSB portals is to strengthen local government presence and capacity at the county level through co-location of UNMISS staff with county authorities, and importantly, to facilitate a greater presence of UNCT and development partners. The CSB concept on one hand, is to provide accommodation using UNMISS resources; on the other hand, is to operate as a community 'portal', built to accommodate UNMISS staff (including civilian staff), and to be co-located with local authorities. Furthermore, it is a base for personnel living in the CSBs to conduct

frequent field missions, travels and provision of support to surrounding counties which would improve peace and security (Da Costa & De Coning, 2013).

UNMISS through this platform has taken seriously its community engagement strategy. For example, in order to avoid the usual contrast where UN structures have fuel and energy whereas the local community has little or none, the plans are to develop parallel community projects. The Indian Government pledged to provide solar power for local authorities, health centers and schools, while UN-Habitat will support CSB locations by introducing piped water systems. Each CSB have approximately 20–25 personnel. This include various substantive personnel such as Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Corrections; a Recovery, Reintegration and Peace building (RRP) officer, as well as up to ten UN police officers and three or four military liaison officers, in addition to administrative Support staff. Each CSB is designed to be complemented by a 'development portal', envisioned as 'the door to the community', to strengthen county authorities through improved infrastructure, the portals which is funded jointly by Norway and the Netherlands, and being built by UNDP, are intended to create a centre that will enable the government and the community to interact (Da Costa & De Coning, 2013).

These CSBs are also designed to act as a hub to encourage UN agencies, funds and programmes and NGOs to operate in remote areas, by providing regular transport links to the county level, as well as physical office and accommodation space. CSB locations will automatically have UNMISS flights twice a week, in order to facilitate the presence of both government and other aid actors. Depending on the security environment, UNMISS will have its military elements located separately, but close to the CSB. The CSBs constitute an attempt by the UN mission to be more decentralized and closer to local populations. This presents an opportunity to reduce their sense of isolation and marginalization. However, except the CSBs can maintain the perception of the UN's neutrality, facilitate expected development and service delivery, and produce tangible dividends in terms of peace for the local populations, they may further contribute to loss of confidence on the UN and its agencies (Karlsrud, 2012).

The three criteria considered for the selection of locations for the CSBs were: 1) conflict-prone areas – where conflict had been recently experienced, enduring or had a greater impact; 2) areas receiving large numbers of returnees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and demobilized SPLA; and 3) areas with a potential for economic recovery with multiplier effects. By December 2012 four CSBs were considered to be operational. All four took over previously established and fully functioning UNMIS team sites. Several of these CSBs is expected to take over former Referendum Support Bases (RSBs) locations established as temporary sites by UNMIS to support the January 2011 referendum that culminated in the independence of South Sudan. South Sudan have ten states and 79 counties in total, UNMISS planned to have its presence in seven of the states, and 45 of counties and, when completed, ultimately covering about 56% of the country (Da Costa & De Coning, 2013).

The effectiveness of this project would partly depend on the ability of UNMISS to ensure the CSBs serves its original purpose, and avoid creating 'a prison like' culture, where staff is hostage or subjected to UN security rules, and end up out of touch with the local societies and the local authorities that they have been tasked to assist. The bases should be well organized and integrated in communities within their designated counties. However, study shows that the earlier enthusiasm and steam surrounding the CSB project was not sustained, as the establishment of 35 CSBs originally planned to be built-up gradually over five years, leading up to 2016 was never met, this review discovered that only 28 out of the 35 CSBs have so far been established as at December 2016 (UN Career, 2016). The project commenced in 2012 to strengthen the presence of national authorities on local level, to co-locate local authorities and civil society organizations (CSOs) with the UN, sharing same standards of buildings and other facilities in a way to close gaps created by sense of insecurity over the years in South Sudan (Karlsrud, 2012).

In practice, the development of the CSBs may have been delayed by what may be described as over-ambitious planning, logistical and bureaucratic challenges, and unmet planning assumptions (Da Costa & Coning, 2013). According to one UNMISS official, the mission also gave priority to mission air assets originally intended for transporting materials for building CBSs, to support the protection of civilians and the provision of humanitarian relief. Apparently, the latest conflict in South Sudan may have stalled the establishment and implementation of the CBSs across the country, frustrating the UN long-term strategic security and development approach intended to prevent reoccurrence of conflict and

crises after the independence in 2011. Unfortunately, these CSBs were not fully established before the next conflict broke in 2013.

5.2. UNMISS Protection of Civilians (Poc) Camps

Other critical security facilities in place, which may have also formed current UN security strategy for protection of civilians living in South Sudan's troubled spots, are the protection of civilians (PoC) camps in 6 locations within South Sudan. These UNMISS "Protection of Civilians" (PoC) sites are located at UN House in Juba, Malaka, Bor, Melut, Wau and Bentiu. South Sudan may be the first country to have experienced a formalized POC sites (Briggs, 2017, p. 12). Throughout the history of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, civilians have sought protection with the UN during times of crisis. From the "safe areas" in Bosnia, to the "protected sites" in Rwanda, to the "protection of civilians sites" (POC sites) in South Sudan today, it has continued to evolve. This review noted that in April 2015, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) released a policy on the protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping, which for the first time stated that as a measure of last resort in extreme situations, UN missions must be prepared to open their gates to protect civilians; of which precedent was set in South Sudan.

Briggs (2017) asserts that

No one predicted that within a week of the crisis unfolding, over 35,000 people would seek refuge inside the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) peacekeeping bases. Even as thousands of people began to pour through the gates, some UNMISS staff members still held out hope that this informal refuge would be short-lived…three years later, over 200,000 IDPs continue to shelter inside these so-called Protection of Civilians (POC) sites within UNMISS bases (p. 12).

Irrespective of unpreparedness of UN to handle the huge humanitarian crisis, the number of IDPs in South Sudan continued to grow. As of 9th of April 2015 (just sixteen months into the conflict), the estimated number of civilians seeking safety in the six UNMISS Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites were 117,604 including 52,908 in Bentiu, 34,420 in Juba UNHouse, 26,596 in Malakal, 2,374 in Bor, 944 in Melut and 362 in Wau. However, Reports indicates that the number of IDPs as at 2017 was over 200,000 (Briggs, 2017).

The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2018 reports that nearly 4 million people (about one in three South Sudanese) have been displaced, including more than 1.9 million internally displaced and over 2.0 million who have fled as refugees to neighboring Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Tens of thousands crossed into Uganda in the first half of 2017 following increased hostilities in East, Central, and Western Equatorial. Uganda now hosts over one million South Sudanese refugees; of those more than 85 percent are women and children. The number of South Sudanese living in six refugee camps in northern Uganda rose to 1.03 million, others crossed to Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR), which are hosts to more than a million refugees. Families crossing the border have cited the security situation, hunger, and disease as the primary driving factors (OCHA, 2018).

As a response to the conflict which spontaneously evolved into a huge humanitarian crisis, different terms were used to describe settlements developing within UNMISS bases. Since the primary concern of UNMISS was to implement its protection of civilians mandate while resisting the creation of IDP camps within its bases, UNMISS therefore proposed and has used the term 'protection of civilians (PoC) sites' as opposed to 'IDP camps'. Humanitarian actors agreed with this terminology because they also hoped that providing assistance on UNMISS bases would be a short-term phenomenon, before business as usual resumed (Lilly, 2014). These PoC camps are internally divided into several blocks that are equipped with latrines and water points.

Lilly (2014) asserts that UNMISS primary task within the PoC sites includes providing defence from external threats and ensure security within the PoC sites, while helping to facilitate the work of humanitarian actors by providing logistical support. But UNMISS and humanitarian actors have been compelled to work together in unusual and exceptional ways in the PoC sites. Even though UNMISS had not intended to provide humanitarian assistance, they had to get involved in providing assistance because humanitarian actors frequently chose to relocate their staff to the camp for safety, the mission had to assume that role on a number of occasions. Hence, a division of labour and roles and

responsibilities were quickly established even though humanitarian actors had some misgivings about operating on UNMISS bases, given the negative impact doing so could have had on their perceived neutrality and independence (Lilly, 2014).

The actual humanitarian response was coordinated by humanitarian actors, who called upon UNMISS to provide what help they required. Parallel (albeit overlapping at times) coordination mechanisms for protection on the one hand and assistance on the other were established. The camp management cluster was activated, which acted as the main operational interface between the parties. At least at the beginning of the crisis, it was not uncommon for UNMISS military, police and civilian personnel to conduct food distributions, establish site management arrangements and even build latrines and water points. Overall, it is believed that UNMISS made a significant contribution to the humanitarian response. Lilly (2014) asserted that by the end of July 2014, 20 UNMISS health clinics had provided medical care to 19, 986 sick civilians including treating 2, 682 injured civilians for gunshot wounds.

5.3. Unmiss Challenges

While contemporary peace operations have become more ambitious and complex than in the past, they are also more contested. Technical and operational problems continue to afflict both UN and AU Peace Support Operations around Africa, but the most critical challenges derive from political factors (Camparini, 2016, p. 20).

The 'political factor' as noted in the foregoing assertion, attempts to magnify the political dimension of the challenges UN missions contends with around the world. The assertion postulates the reality of challenges peacekeepers go through in carrying out their obligation of maintaining peace and security around the world. The political will to commit to peace by stakeholders is a major challenge that does not only complicate the matter, but creates other challenges that hinder achievement of peace and security. The challenges faced by UNMISS in carrying out its mandate in South Sudan is certainly a problem critical to this study.

Briggs (2017) also pays attention to the UN challenges in protecting PoC sites when it asserts that "a first issue that must be acknowledged is the magnitude of the challenge facing peacekeepers in each of their operations" (p.17). As commonly experienced, protection of civilians' sites most times emerges in environments where extreme violence is characterized, and often targets civilians. In situations as such, peacekeepers come under pressure to not only to provide security to the civilians in the protected sites, but are also being expected to bring an end to ethnic cleansing and genocide that are often associated with these crisis, even when not stipulated in their operational mandate. This desperation from the target population may be understandable, but however exposes many of the challenges missions face in the area of crippling resource, personnel, and mandate constraints, combined with overwhelming security threats, making it difficult to provide protection for civilians (Briggs, 2017).

The United Nations operation in South Sudan especially under UNMISS, have continued to face obvious challenges rising from attack on UN facilities and officials by gunmen to resistance from the Government of South Sudan. This resistance and other challenges raise questions on the acceptability and efficiency of the UN Mission in South Sudan since inception in 2011. The foregoing assertion is hinged on the fact that that there are still reports of rising insecurity in the crisis torn country despite the UN intervention efforts. Notably, UNMISS operations have severally been resisted by armed groups, one of such led to the shooting down of a UN monitoring helicopter in December 2013.

There are also reports of deepening hostility manifesting in threats, intimidation, harassment and attacks against UN camps. Despite efforts to ensure the country nurtures peacefully, the volatile security situation in the northern border areas and the continued activities of armed groups in Jonglei State poses risks for United Nations personnel, including aid workers, as did the increase in criminality, particularly armed robberies and hijackings, in some urban centers in the country. (Nakimangole, 2013) On Thursday 17 April 2014, 58 people were killed and at least 100 people wounded when an armed mob stormed the UN base in Bor (UN News, 2016). These attacks definitely affect the mission performance directly or indirectly.

As postulated in Briggs (2017)

Between December 2013 and December 2016 there would be four major attacks on the PoC sites, and innumerable smaller incidents. Particularly egregious were the attacks on the Bor and MalakalPoC sites:

in April 2014, a group of youth stormed the POC site in Bor, killing at least 50 civilians, and in February 2016, the attack on the Malakal POC site killed an estimated 30 people and burned around a third of the site to the ground (p.16).

Briggs (2017) further exposes the extreme challenges faced by the UN mission in South Sudan's complicated environment; UNMISS combatant and noncombatant officers, journalists, civil society and human rights activists are not left out of these attacks. Briggs (2017) alerted the use of deliberate attacks on peacekeepers and international personnel as a means of disincentivizing the UN from proactively engaging during a crisis, or provoking troop withdrawal. Citing the genocide in Rwanda, Briggs (2017) narrates how the genocidaires, during the first days of the Rwandan genocide in April 1994, deliberately targeted a contingent of Belgian peacekeepers, knowing that this would cause Belgium to withdraw the remainder of its troops and further weaken the already struggling UNAMIR force. Their plan succeeded as majority of the peacekeeping troops were withdrawn (Briggs, 2017).

Other challenges the mission face include what report refers to as weak coordination and communication barrier between the peacekeeping troops. It is argued that the separate and linguistically incompatible command structures of the Indian, Rwandan and Ethiopian troops made a swift and coordinated response near impossible during the Malaka camp invasion in 2016 (Foltyn, 2017). The lack of roads and accessibility of aid workers to conflict torn areas poses another challenge. Personnel and equipment have to be flown in some cases to those areas. This is compounded by the long rainy season that isolates much of the country for half the year. However, these are well-known facts that could have been given greater prominence in planning processes. Conversely, UNMISS has had little control over the (UN) availability of financial resources or the delays in receiving equipment and materials (Willmot et al., 2015).

Another confronting issue noted in Briggs (2017) is what may be seen as a 'self-made' challenge, it is related to the delays associated in adapting the mandate to protect civilians at the start of the crisis in South Sudan. The UN Security Council took nearly six months for the priority mandate to be changed from state-building to protection of civilians. Even when the state-building aspect of the mandate had been replaced with protection of civilians, its legacy appeared to continue to have a detrimental impact on the willingness of UN mission leadership and troop contributing countries to uphold the new focus to protect civilians. These delays definitely may have permitted the destruction of lives and properties of some civilians which ideally would have been saved (Briggs, 2017).

Further challenges identified in Karlsrud (2012) emerged from the lack of enough engineering capacity of the mission. According to the Author, the mission has been running at less than half its planned engineering capacity. This constraint may have hampered swift and effective access to communities where intervention is needed due to broken-down bridges or roads, which order wise would have been repaired by these UNMISS engineers. This scarcity of engineers also partly affected the efforts by the mission to efficiently conclude the construction of the 35 County Support Bases (CSBs) originally proposed to be concluded within 6 years from commencement. The CSBs is one of the UN strategy designed to sustain peace and security in South Sudan immediately after her independence, and before the crises that broke in 2013.

The deployment of additional engineering contingent from South Korea with greater geographical flexibility was expected to speed up construction and establishment of these CSBs. However, as at December 2013 when the latest conflict broke, most of these facilities were not operational, hence couldn't have made expected impact to either entrench peace or prevent escalation of conflicts before the outrageous breakdown of law and order on the evening of December 15, 2013 when fighting erupted in Juba between forces loyal to the President SalvaKirr and former First Vice President RiekMachar. Over the following days the conflict, ethnically-motivated violence surged in Juba and other major towns with a death toll of over 10,000 within the first two weeks of the conflict (Briggs, 2017). As mentioned earlier, most part of the CSBs project were at elementary stage as at December 2013, and was not also possible for authors such as Karlsrud (2012) and Da Costa & De Coning (2013) to offer more comprehensive assessment of the impact of the policy and its effect on the society as it relates to promotion of peace and security. However, this study attempts to bridge the knowledge gap by assessing the status of these CSBs and their effectiveness.

6. CONCLUSION

The security challenges faced in South Sudan today have variety of causes with multidimensional implications. The natural disasters caused by climate change, leading to draught and food shortages, to the deep rooted ethnic motivated crimes, conflicts, political instability and corruption which has dragged the young nation into unwarranted poverty are all basic indices of the security situation of South Sudan today. The Leaders of South Sudan, Mr. SalvaKiirMayardit (from the Dinka tribe) and main opposition leader, Mr. Rick Macher (from the Nuer tribe) struggle over power lead the country into a civil war since December 2013 leaving over 400,000 dead and over 3.5 million South Sudanese displaced, and worsened existing hardship experienced before the conflict. The political turmoil and security problems bedeviling the country have persisted despite efforts by the UN, NGOs, concerned nations, and individuals.

The United Nations intervention through UNMISS has deployed both material and human resources to South Sudan since 2013 when the conflict broke, for the primary purpose of protecting civilians, entrenching peace and security, and strengthening the rule of law. This task has come with enormous challenges highlighted in this study. The amount of resources deployed annually by the UN to South Sudan cannot be quantified in one swipe due to several other channels of deployments through her Agencies, with the hope of finding lasting peace and security in the young country. The hope for a brighter South Sudan relies on the actions and inactions of relevant stakeholders in the South Sudan project.

Every action must first be considered in the interest of the South Sudan people, and strategically taken towards restoring peace and security in the country. There must be a synergy between the intervening international agencies and the government/people of South Sudan for peace and security to be restored in the country. Yes, there may be some 'tooting problems' of distrust between UNMISS and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) that led to various incidents of sabotage on the mission, which by effect may have led to the protraction of the current security problem. However, the government (GoSS) and the people must cooperate with the UN in the larger interest of lasting peace and security in South Sudan.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Study recommends the following:

Short Term Approach

1. Increase more Personnel on ground, both military and police for more patrols within and outside the camps, for swift responses in time of security breach.

2. UN must maintain neutrality in order to build trust and improve their relationship with people and Government of South Sudan towards peace, respect Agreements and human rights. South Sudan Government, and some interest groups involved in the ongoing conflict had accused UN and some of her staff of partiality in some instances.

3. More funding for UNMISS peace support operation in South Sudan in order to elongate their period of stay in the country, in order to sustain every gains made, and to establish permanent peace and stability in South Sudan.

4. UNMISS should exhibit the willpower to fully implement Chapter 7 of her Mandate anytime the need arises so as to also show capability to enforce peace and security.

5. Increased equipment to help personnel have easy and timely access to troubled areas to protect civilians and confront any rising incident or threat to peace and security.

6. Intensify the disarmament program to recover most of the illegal weapons in circulation.

7. The international community and nations of interest should all join hands in making genuine efforts, void of economic/political interest to resolving the conflict and establish peace and security in South Sudan.

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