

Party Factionalization of *Golkar* at Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential Election

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Abstract: *The holding of general elections, both legislative, presidential and regional head elections, aims to regenerate democratic power. To realize the implementation of the general election, political parties are indispensable as one of the pillars of democracy so that the general election goes well. Political parties have the task of accommodating people's aspirations to become a more systematic public opinion so that it can be the basis for regular decision-making. In addition, political parties have an important role and strategic position in a country to develop democracy, and even become an important part in determining the direction of democracy. Therefore, political parties become pillars in a democratic system, so that their position is very dominant as an effective representative institution in aggregating all public interests towards the state. However, the important role and strategic position of these political parties has not yet been fully utilized by political parties to provide political education to the public properly, in fact many political parties are trapped by internal party conflicts of interest as a result of the existence of factions that occur in the community. internal parties, one of which is the Wonosobo Regency Golkar Party. Based on the problems mentioned above, the authors formulate research questions, namely: (1) how did the internal factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency occur in the 2019 Presidential Election? (2) what is the form of factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential Election?. Based on the problem formulation, the research objectives are: (1) to understand the occurrence of internal factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential Election. (2) to understand the form of factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential Election.*

Keywords: *Factionalization, Golkar Party, Presidential Election*

1. INTRODUCTION

The holding of general elections, both legislative, presidential and regional head elections, aims to regenerate democratic power. To realize the implementation of the general election, political parties are indispensable as one of the pillars of democracy so that the general election goes well. Political parties have the task of accommodating people's aspirations to become a more systematic public opinion so that it can be the basis for regular decision making (Darmawan, 2015). In addition, political parties have an important role and strategic position in a country to develop democracy, and even become an important part in determining the direction of democracy (Chiaromonte and Emanuele, 2017). Therefore, political parties become pillars in a democratic system, so that their position is very dominant as an effective representative institution in aggregating all public interests towards the state. However, the important role and strategic position of these political parties has not yet been fully utilized by political parties to provide political education to the public properly, in fact many political parties are trapped by internal party conflicts of interest as a result of the existence of factions formed in the political parties. political parties.

From a political science perspective, the existence of factionalization that is formed within the party is usually due to a close relationship such as religion, ethnicity, race, family, and common interests which will usually develop strongly, especially before political contestations and in the arena of changing the general chairman of a political party.

In the context of the historical development of parties in Indonesia, the phenomenon of political party splits can be seen from the conflict events experienced by the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII) which was split into two factions, namely: 1) factions that are not affiliated with the banned party organization or often referred to as the Sarekat Islam (SI) or the white group; 2) the faction with close ties to the communists was given the nickname Sarekat Islam (SI) red. The existence of this has caused political parties to be shackled after the event of Indonesian independence. When Soekarno introduced Guided Democracy, tensions and conflicts within political parties decreased, due to restrictions on the existence of parties. In the 1997 general election contestation, there has been a factionalization within the Islamic and Nationalist parties. The parties consisted of the Working Group (*Golkar*), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and the Indonesian Islamic Syarikat Party (PSI) (Starner, 1964).

During the New Order era, political parties also experienced factionalization, in which the regime in power at that time streamlined the political parties that had a fairly large number, simplified or combined with coercion, namely PDI and PPP. The authoritarian style of government that forced the merging of parties was the cause of conflict within the political parties at that time (Starner, 1964). During the reform era, factionalization in political parties experienced a significant development. This can be seen from several factional divisions within political parties which are increasingly marked by the emergence of new political parties that participated in the 1999 to 2014 elections, as experienced by the *Golkar* Party.

The phenomenon of factionalization experienced by the *Golkar* Party can be seen from the various series of events that occurred within the *Golkar* Party after the Reformation. First, the faction formed during the election for the general chairman of the *Golkar* Party on July 11, 1998 between the Tandjung and Sudrajat camps which led to the birth of the Justice and Unity Party, which was declared by the Sudradjat faction on January 15, 1999. Second, the faction emerged in the general election in 1999. 2004 between Tandjung and Kalla, in which, Tandjung gave support to the candidate pair Wiranto-Wahid. However, Kalla instead ran for vice president in pairs with Yudhoyono. As a result of this conflict, Kalla was dismissed by some of his *Golkar* Party advisers. The presidential and vice presidential elections in 2004 which were won by the Yudhoyono-Kalla pair made the internal political constellation of the *Golkar* Party turn closer to power.

Third, factionalization within the *Golkar* Party occurred again during the 2014 presidential election, where Bakrie, who served as general chairman, gave support to the Prabowo-Hatta candidate pair which ended in the defeat of the Jokowi-Kalla candidate pair. The criticism of Bakrie came from Laksono. So in December 2014 Laksono held a rival *Golkar* National Conference in Ancol (<http://www.nasional/pilpres-2014->)

After an agreement was reached to make peace between the Bakrie and Laksono camps, the *Golkar* Party's National Deliberation resulted in a new leadership under Novanto's leadership. While in office and about to enter the final term of leadership, Hartarto was involved in a conflict with Soesatyo, but it was resolved, and the *Golkar* Party managed to maintain its position by gaining support of 12.31% at the national level and occupying the second position where the first rank was occupied by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle. (<http://www.nasional/pilpres-2014->)

In the 2019 presidential election, indications of internal factionalization within the *Golkar* Party were seen in cases of support for *Golkar* Party cadres' votes for other candidates (split ticket voting) outside the coalition. The transfer of vote support is not a new thing in the arena of general election competition in Indonesia. The condition of society that has entered a pragmatic circle of life forces the arena of general elections to get as much personal benefit as possible, while idealism is no longer something that is heeded by most people because it is considered not to provide material benefits. Thus, the transfer of votes becomes a common thing, not a taboo in society as a voter.

Furthermore, the form of diversion of vote support (split ticket voting) ahead of the 2019 Presidential election can be seen from the results of the Indonesian Political Indicator survey on December 16 to 26 2018 with a total of 1 220 respondents and the population is all people who have voting rights. By using multistage random sampling and 2.9 margin of error with 95% confidence degree. The results show that the number of *Golkar* Party voters who supported candidate number 02 was 1.2%.

From the side of the party coalition. on the basis of the Jokowi-Amin coalition, the United Development Party is a member of the coalition in which the most bases are out of the way of party support for the candidate, 43.2%. Then Hanura 39.6%, Golkar 31.2%, Perindo 27.9%, National Democrat 27.8%, National Awakening Party 27%, PSI 8.1% and the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 6%.

Thus, when viewed from the political parties as a whole, almost all political parties experienced split votes in support of presidential candidates who were outside the support of the coalition as instructed and determined by the party's policy line. This phenomenon can be said to be reasonable and unnatural. It is said to be reasonable because a political party consisting of individuals who have uncertain desires and goals is the same as the party as the organization in which the individual belongs. On the other hand, it is said to be unnatural because it is ironic that it seems that political parties do not have the power to direct their members or cadres in accordance with party policies.

When viewed from the base of support for the Prabowo-Uno coalition, the Berkarya party gave the most support to the incumbent candidate pair as much as 42.1%. Then Democrat 40.5%, PAN 26%, PKS 21% and Gerindra 14%. In detail, sociologically, the base of the Prabowo-Uno coalition is more divided into women, the older age group, the upper class, in rural areas, especially in the central region of the island of Java to eastern Indonesia. This group is usually more passive in political and government matters. Meanwhile, in general, the basis of the Joko Widodo-Maruf Amin coalition is dominated by millennials who are young and occur in several areas in Indonesia such as Sumatra, Banten, and West Java.

On Jokowi's personal issues, the masses in the coalition supporting Prabowo-Uno tend to have a fairly high solidity compared to the masses in the coalition supporting Jokowi-Amin. Meanwhile, on Prabowo's personal issues, the two coalition bases are more solid in groups that are more exposed to issues, and the Jokowi-Amin coalition base is more solid than the Prabowo-Uno coalition base in each group (Indonesian Political Indicators, 2019). Thus, politically split-ticket voting is a phenomenon that indicates the existence of factionalization in political parties both at the central and regional levels. One of the political parties in the region that indicated factionalization was the Golkar Party of Wonosobo Regency.

The factionalization or splitting of political parties has resulted in the exodus of marginalized factions to other political parties. The shift of political party cadres to other parties can also be influenced by the decline in vote support for certain political parties so that they are considered unprofitable. Klinken's internal party divisions in the midst of Indonesia's political transition were marked by transitional stages and the rule of law, which was renegotiated in favor of competitive elections.

Seeing the various problems that exist in the internal political parties, especially those concerning factionalization, the author argues that research on factionalization is very important on the grounds that currently factionalization is not just an ordinary phenomenon, but has almost become a culture that is always present coloring the internal journey of political parties. If only as an ordinary phenomenon, factionalization will not be so dangerous for political parties because its emergence is only temporary. However, if factionalization has become an institutionalized culture within a political party, it is certain that the political party will lose its way as an organization that has duties and functions as a channel for aspirations in aggregating public interests. Therefore, the authors are interested in conducting research on factionalization within the Golkar Party of Wonosobo Regency based on several basic considerations. First, rational reasons, namely the empirical indications that show factionalization within the Golkar Wonosobo Party, this is as reported by the media, both print and electronic media. In the general daily news.detik.com it was reported that the Wonosobo Golkar Party experienced sharp political dynamics in the 2019 Presidential election which ended with dynamics. Even as a result of this incident, the chairman of the Golkar Party DPD II Wonoosobo was dismissed from his position. The dismissal letter was stated in the Central Java Golkar Party's DPD Decree.

Second, the author is of the view that the Golkar Party is a unique party. This can be seen from the history of the Golkar Party at the beginning of the reform which received many demands and lawsuits from various parties, even the public demanded that the Golkar Party be disbanded because it was considered a legacy of the New Order. However, until now the Golkar Party still survives and is one of the strongest parties in the big three circles after the PDI-P and the Gerindra Party which supports the government.

Third, in terms of the complexity of the problem. If it is proven that the faction exists within Wonosobo's Golkar Party, then regardless of whether the factionalization that appears within the Golkar Party is a political fabrication or not, what is clear is that the formation of a faction if not managed properly will have a negative impact on the intra-Golkar Party and for the development of democracy. .

Based on the description of the background above, the focus of the problem in this study is the internal factionalization of the Golkar Party of Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential election. Thus, the formulation of the problem is: (1) how did the factionalization of the Golkar Party of Wonosobo Regency occur in the 2019 Presidential election. ?; (2) what is the form of factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential election?. Based on the formulation of the problem, the research objectives are: (1) to understand the occurrence of factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential election; (2) to understand the form of Golkar Party factionalization in Wonosobo Regency in the 2019 Presidential election.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Factionalization

A faction is something that has a single function and has access to limited physical and social resources. Usually the achievement of resource control is carried out in a pragmatic and profit-seeking way through actors or agents. In the structural functional context, factions are small groups, ethnic groups, kinship groups and are characterized by an informal model that focuses on group leaders (Dennis, 2020). In addition, factions are also groups that try to serve a positive social function and can also become groups that cause social pathology. Faction relations and class conflicts are seen as blockages in a change. Factions are also called conflict groups that seek to orientate political interests whose members are formed and maintained by their leaders. The unity that exists within a faction stems from the flexible, loose, structured relationship between the leader and his followers and the personalistic character. In a wider context, factions can also be understood as groups of individuals, within a large-scale entity, political parties, for example, trade unions, or other groups united by a common political goal. In political parties, factions include fragmented sub-factions, or as a bloc of power and voting bloc whose members unite to advance agendas and achieve goals based on party dynamics (Misra, 2003)

The researchers used various independent variables and referred to several interrelated components and focused on the typology of intra-party groups with various symbols, dimensional attributes and different categories according to the variables used such as group number, stability, organization, function and role (Bettcher, 2003). 2005). Zarisiki reveals the causes of factionalization. There are at least four factors that cause factionalization, namely socio-economic affinities, shared strategies, shared values, and personal loyalty. Socioeconomic affinities, the socio-economic conditions of a country that is entering a democratic emergency period in which it has institutionalized a pattern of patron-client that provides opportunities for factionalization to flourish. A joint strategy is a strategy that has been jointly formulated and shaped to achieve a common goal which results in a strong desire to make it happen together as well. Shared values are a common belief in a value that causes a group of people to come together to realize the values they have believed in. Then personal loyalty (personal loyalty) is a loyal attitude that a person has towards individuals and is not loyal to the political party where he belongs, causing the formation of a personal pattern of patron-client relationships. This relationship pattern is one way to make it easier for politicians to develop their political careers which can then create factions (Zariski, 1960).

In a further development of factionalization, Sartori presents his thoughts on the typology of factionalization into four dimensions, namely 1) the division of left and right ideological parties; 2) motivation; 3) organization; 4) ideological. The scheme designed to distinguish factions from cliques and tendencies when confronted with principles and interests against a model in the institutionalization of intraparty factions results in two dimensions of intraparty groups in a separate quadrant, namely client, trend faction, interests faction and principle faction. All these typologies to make it easier to understand the framework and concepts that describe the nature of factions. (Scott, Warr, and Sartori, 1977)

The existence of factions in political party circles can be identified by looking at the characteristics inherent in them, such as the projection of individual ambitions that are very similar to the family groups that dominate politics, political gangs, *juntos*. In the process of forming intra-party factions, they have the urge to lead as a form of competitive behavior so that interactions between all actors involved individually such as candidates, legislators, appointed officials continue to run well to achieve political goals (Scott et al, 1977). The factions in political parties are based on individual desires that are almost the same as gangs in the political stage, or a combination of families who have a dominant position in the political arena. When factions are formed within intra-party, communication patterns that are built between political actors appointed to important positions such as legislators or candidates, they have various incentives to lead which indicate a competitive behavior (Scott et al, 1977).

In Belloni and Beller's view, there are important elements in a faction, namely 1) a small group that is part of a large group; 2) the small group is united by the same goals and interests; 3) these groups compete for power in both private and government organizations. In pursuing their interests these factions are not bound by any rules so that if a clash occurs it is considered a normal and natural thing to happen. (Belloni and Beller, 1976).

From a structural point of view, Beller and Belloni identified three types of organizational differences within factions, namely 1) there is a tendency within the factions or called cliques; 2) consisting of clichés, group or personal factions; 3) a faction whose existence is intentionally regulated and institutionalized or organized. Meanwhile, Huntington saw several factors that contributed to the emergence of factionalization, namely 1) influenced by the purge within the party; 2) the presence of tactics or strategies; 3) caused by a developing issue; 4) based on an ideology; 5) the existence of legislative cohesion. (Boucek, 2009)

According to the structural functional view described by Beller and Belloni, there are three types of factions, namely 1) factional tendencies or cliques; 2) client, group or private faction; 3) organized or institutionalized factions (Belloni and Beller, 1976). At the organizational level, intra-party factions can arise from a group that does not have the power even from hidden groups that are not well organized, then arrangements are made so that they become organized, where the encouragement in these groups begins with personal interests which then experience change into group interests that have a basis or principle with various combinations of interests. Therefore, the organizations contained in the factions do not have clarity between which factions have strengths or weaknesses (Boucek, 2009).

An explanation of the typology of factionalization can be seen in several types. First, the typology of the *kleintalism* faction. This typology is a type or type of organization that has a dependence on individual or personal relationships. The client in question is a client who has a structure that can be described in a pyramidal manner which is built through the relationship between patron-client in a political party, where this client regulates the pattern of vertical relationships among politicians who are in the management of the party. This type of faction can develop at different levels of government and political party organization. Second, the typology of tendencies. In this type there is the involvement of informal organizations which are not too many in number, and do not have the strength of resilience, cohesion, or discipline. A politician will identify through a tendency on the grounds of commitment to an ideology or the existence of common views regarding common policies. Thus, this typology is very concerned and interested in purposive incentives that are collective in nature. The members involved are often not recognized, in an informal state, even still appear to be in a liquid state. There is no need to set the direction of activity vertically. It is possible for politicians to gather in a circle of leaders who have similarities in supporting a view or can group together collegially (Bettcher, 2005).

Third, factions that are almost the same as clients but whose structure does not have full dependence on the accumulation of relationships in personal exchanges and focus more on seeking patronage for members. This faction is called the interest faction, because all forms of interest are directed to the interests of groups that are more organized in an organizational manner. In carrying out its operations,

members have full awareness that is intended for a group that has privileges and superior resources for its members. The faction and its leader are largely determined by the faction members. The condition of its structure and membership is in a stable and more formal position. This faction is almost the same as an institutionalized faction, namely a faction that is more organized or organized and has a rule, has a central place, has procedures and is scheduled (Bettcher, 2005).

Fourth, factions that both have a high level of developing an organization, but have incentives like the trend faction. This faction does not pursue patrons in a group, but rather searches for collective goods that can be achieved through more ideological policies or programs that can be accepted by all members. The basis of commitment is formed from members' beliefs. Furthermore, in this principle faction the organization is developed to achieve the interests of group goals rather than maintaining a structure to fulfill the interests of members (Bettcher, 2005). Likewise, the study of factionalization conducted by Janda and Huntington revealed that the factionalization that emerged was caused by several factors, namely party purge, legislative cohesion, ideology, issues, leadership, strategy and tactics, and party purge (Boucek, 2008).

Factions are formed based on various personal interests, not a moral commitment in temporary groups whose members are recruited from various bases. Leadership in a faction comes from a social background that has similarities in order to put pressure on distance in social competition. Faction leaders mostly come from the dominant sector of society, this aims to obtain and control the resources needed to determine and recruit a larger membership base. From the similarity of backgrounds, privileges can be obtained, so that factional leaders are more likely to share the same political goals and not contradict the existing basic structure of a society. Within the scope of political parties, the decisions taken tend to be authoritative and will take place over time so that they can form an established behavior and are able to interact in every moment and situation (Harmel et al., 1995).

Hume reveals that factions are organized on the basis of interests. In Hume's view there are three types of factions, namely 1) factions formed based on interests; 2) principal faction; 3) individual faction or family faction. Of the three factions, the most uncompromising is the principle faction, and this faction is very influential on the existence of political parties. In this faction, all principles can be agreed upon if all of them are in accordance with the common principles to implement them (Hine, 1982). Meanwhile, Sieyes (1789–1799), he rejected the existence of differences in minority factions or individuals who play at the government level. He argues that the social contract has a function to provide solutions to all differences that exist in interest groups because they have been bound by the power of the majority. In any level, the ruling or the most powerful faction is not justified if it forces against other factions only because of a difference of will with the majority faction, then all these factions must leave the government they are under. As a solution, the majority can take action to expel the minority faction because it is considered not to represent the general will (Rainsford, 2018). In a different opinion, Madison revealed that the faction which is the sum of all citizens, both the majority and the minority who can be united and driven by the existence of drives and desires and the same goals, or interests, or other things that are considered contrary to other citizens. . Madison sees that most of the behavior found within the faction is considered bad (Medvic, 2007).

Leaders in the factions are taken from members who have the same background with the aim that the turmoil and competition that will occur in the faction can be suppressed and overcome properly. In addition, leaders in factions are usually taken from dominant members of society in an effort to control and obtain resources as needed in order to build a greater power base. The privilege obtained from the recruitment of bases from people with the same background, leaders in factions tend to have the same political goals and do not contradict the basic structural conditions in society (Medvic, 2007).

Scarrow expresses the meaning of faction in politics as a negative meaning that does not provide good even less in line with intellectual discipline. Factions are described as part of a circle of ideas or individual interests, both sects and religious factions. Real examples as real examples of actors in factions are all members in parliament as representatives of political parties in an effort to pursue the goal of being re-elected as members of parliament (Persico, Pueblita, and Silverman, 2011). In internal political parties, factions grow and develop as a result of political behavior that is pragmatic and always looking for profit. The position of factions in political parties has significant power, especially in terms of decision making that is centralized and authoritative. With this, then the factions as groups

that have power within the party communicate to form an established pattern with all members at all times, especially when there are political moments that tend to provide opportunities for the appearance of these factions (Meyer, Shih, et al. and Lee, 2016).

The pattern of intra-party group organization comes from weak and disorganized groups or also called latent groups which are then organized and organized informally to become organized. The form of encouragement in the group was initially purely self-interested (self-interested) then turned into a group that has a principle (faction of principle) which is incorporated from various combinations. The factions in the organization do not have a clear line in dividing the strong and the weak, both client factions, tendencies, factions of interest and principle factions. As endemic symptoms in the form of patronage, clientelism, and deviation, factions are not fit to grow and develop in a group of countries because they can reduce the quality of democracy (Hagopian, 2015).

There are different views between Madison and Rousseau in seeing the objectivity of factional interests in the political arena. The objectivity of the public interest, whether permanent or aggregated in society, is a combination of various special interests or various combinations of interests which are dominated by the interests of the majority. Meanwhile, Rousseau revealed that the public interest can be seen in the existence of a deliberative process that exists in a small, homogeneous, decentralized, and non-commercial country. In this case, Madison interprets the actions taken by the factions trying to find a middle ground between an idealist and proceduralist conception in a more pluralist frame. Madison positioned the faction through a representative vision by trying to consider constituent pressure rationally and through deliberation. The faction that has been described by Madison is closer to the style or model of representation that elevates a government that exceeds individual interests (Dahl, 2005).

From several theorizations that have conducted studies on factionalization, Boucek's factionalization theory is a fairly recent theory in studying the factors that cause the emergence of factions accompanied by conflict within a party's circle. This is similar to the results of Boucek's study of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, and the Canadian Liberal Party, the Conservative Party in England, and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy (Boucek, 2009).

The factors that influence the occurrence of factionalization in Boucek's view. First, the success of a political party in which there is competition within the party circle. A political party that has successfully won the general election will become a magnet for politicians who have high ambitions in the stage of political competition, they recognize their success and as much as possible suppress the resources that exist within their own supporting environment. This situation further motivates the dynamics in a tight competition and further sharpens the strength of various factions that have similarities in terms of goals and interests. The success of a party in a general election can provide a strong enough impetus to fight for positions in the internal circle (Boucek, 2012).

Second, heterogeneity which has the potential to cause conflict in ideology and is vulnerable to division. The existence of diversity in the dominant political party in the realm of power can increase a conflict pressure on ideological policy makers which at a later stage can increase the risk of ideological divisions. When there is one strong faction in a political party in the midst of various factions, it will be the impetus for different desires and goals. However, if these differences are not successfully processed and managed properly, then the political party will certainly be trapped in internal divisions and conflicts.

Third, key positions are contested in the ranks of supporting careers in politics, although on a limited scale. In this case, usually political parties that have a dominant position become a bone of contention to achieve a political career. As a result of this struggle, the party with the dominant position becomes the main goal and target for all power seekers, even though they realize that the existence of this position will not be enough to fulfill the desire of all factions to seek power within the party's internal environment.

Fourth, the push for welfare becomes something that is attractive to parties and individuals. Welfare issues raised within political parties will result in a change in the balance between individual interests and career goals versus the goals of the collective party. This condition will continue for quite a long time as long as the issue exists so that it is possible to marginalize the collective interests of the party. From the side of the factions are encouraged to continue to emerge and persist in order to gain access

in order to obtain prosperity even though they have to sacrifice the interests of the party. Togetherness and values that have been agreed upon within the party will automatically fade, so this is where prosperity will cause the factions to forget their initial commitment as a collective unit and turn towards personal interests. Furthermore, the second important aspect of Boucek's theory is the form of factionalization. According to Boucek, factionalization as a phenomenon that is increasingly occurring in political parties leads to three forms of factionalization, namely cooperative factionalization, competitive and generative forms. The three forms of factionalization have their respective impacts depending on the form (Boucek, 2009).

First, the form of cooperative factionalization can be seen from the process of forming parties and changing a government that is built on the basis of agreement or consensus. The factions also always make efforts to accommodate and aggregate the interests of political parties while maintaining the stability of group identity as one of the instruments in conducting intra-party cooperation so that it remains unified. This form tends to have a positive impact.

Second, the form of competitive factionalization which is marked by the division of parties into factions and contradicting each other, differences in intra-party views, polarized and fragmented party opinions in party centrifuges. This centrifugal pull has a negative impact on the party, namely the increasingly strong situation of division and has the potential for the formation of new political parties.

Third, the form of degenerative factionalization, namely factions that occur when actors make choices to maximize profit seeking in a distributed circle of patronage. The impact of this form of factionalization tends to be negative, even sharper than the competitive form. The stronger the right of private ownership compared to the issue of collectivity within the party can certainly be a driving force for the emergence of a destructive shift or rotation of factionalism towards party division. The existence of competition within factions that occurs within political parties can be an opportunity for new episodes of division. If conditions that occur like this are not immediately addressed, the cooperation that has taken place will be replaced by threats to the party's internal stability and lead to a degenerative area that changes all the time and has resulted in a shift in the pattern of competition among factions and party relations which is ultimately a party. experiencing setbacks.

Factionalization does occur in various countries at all levels of organization (political parties) and people's lives, including Indonesia. In Indonesia, there are several things that cause factionalization and internal divisions within political parties, namely 1) because of political parties that have failed to produce good leaders through screening or conventions of candidate leaders by political parties; 2) the absence of an element of justice in an effort to create an internal party system; 3) the emergence of a pragmatic attitude among the political elite within the party's internal circle.

2.2. Political Party Elites and the Occurrence of Factionalization

In intra-party politics, factionalization theory is directed to analyze the actions taken by those involved in political activities. There are two groups involved in the activities of an organization such as a political party, namely individuals who have a power base and advantages compared to other individuals (elite), and individuals who do not have a power base (non-elite) or the masses.

Elite groups have a very large role and influence compared to other groups, and dominate in carrying out activities of daily life. The magnitude of the role and influence in the group is due to the advantages possessed by the individual and not possessed by other individuals, and this is at the same time a differentiator between one group and another. These advantages are resources that are used as tools to regulate and control certain parts of life. In the next stage, the elite group will play a role and exert its influence to determine where the life style in society is headed. Although the influence of the elite is very large, in terms of quantity it is less than the quantity of other community members who do not have a role and influence. However, even though they are few in terms of quantity, they have the power to force or order other individuals to submit to their orders (Mizruchi 2017).

The term elite is widely studied by theorists in the social context of society, organizations, both social organizations, religious organizations, and political organizations such as political parties and government. Pareto, Mosca, Keller are figures who focus on elite and mass studies. In the study of terminology elite refers to a group or a group that exists in society that has various advantages, advantages or superiority when compared to other groups.

Pareto's opinion is quite clear about the elite. In looking at elite issues, Pareto places more emphasis on observing all activities carried out by the community. He presents index numbers to be used as indicators of individual abilities in various aspects of life in society. What is meant by index is the labeling of the ability of individuals who have a high rank in one aspect of life in society, so they are classified in groups called elites. On the other hand, those who have a low index score cannot be classified in the elite group category.

The elite layer that is holding power in the political realm is a well-organized and well-organized group and has political authority. Elites as an organized minority group will certainly carry out coercion of will by means of manipulation and violence in all lines of people's lives, especially in democracy. In addition, the elite will also enjoy every advantage resulting from a power. The power they get does not come from the community or the economy purely but from organizations that have a correlation with the realm of public or state power (Wintrop 2007).

One thing that is the main thesis of the power elite is that those who occupy positions both in the economic, military, and political fields, form an integrated power elite space in which all decisions determine the basic structure and direction of American society. The dominance of power continues to be maintained through making various decisions rather than taking care of improving people's welfare (Asomah 2020).

Because the position occupied by the elite is not absolute, in the sense that the position occupied by a group of elites at one time will shift and be replaced by another elite group. This fact is a necessity that must be faced by the elite because of the arrival of a change in people's lives. The ruling elite will not always rule because naturally the abilities of the elite group are limited by their own strength and age. This event is called Pareto as Deacy (decay). Here, there will be a shift in position where the elite group was slowly descending and no longer dominant in society, and non-elite groups will appear to enter the elite environment to replace elite groups who are no longer in their positions (Mizruchi 2017).

During the New Order era, the main elite in Indonesia was the military, where at that time the military had a strong role and great authority in the economic, social and political fields as an effort to maintain power. The existence of the military is spread throughout the realm of government, in parliament, in the main fields of state property, as well as in various political parties that are in power. In the Golkar Party, the role of the military is so prominent that it can take any action without any fear of violating the law so that many civilians are marginalized, or in a more extreme language, become victims.

After the reform, there was a shift in elite power, which was originally held and controlled by the military, to a civilian elite as the controller of power. The military was led to return to its original position back to the barracks. And this is where the political role of the military elite is reduced until the military's political rights are revoked. The military elite currently has the main authority, namely in the field of national defense, namely defending the country from all kinds of disturbances, obstacles and obstacles that come from outside or other countries. The military is prohibited from entering the practical political stage. Thus the consequence is that the military is not given political space and must leave parliament.

The tendency for conflict and factionalization to occur is not due to differences in ideology, vision, mission and party platforms, but is caused by pragmatic and oligarchic actions or behavior of elites to enjoy power through the choice of political party coalitions in carrying out candidates. The conflict that occurred started from the existence of inter-elite conflict related to the elite's attitude towards a strategy in the struggle for power. The pragmatic and oligarchic attitude driven by the desire to power has made the party elite separate from political parties as barracks and are more interested in establishing new parties.

There are two characters in the current coalition model. First, there is an effort to seek office (office seeking), in which building a coalition of political parties is more based on a desire to seek and widen opportunities to obtain office space in the cabinet. Second, there is an effort to seek votes (vote seeking), where in forming a coalition of party elites is more based on efforts to win the competition in the general election. The two coalitions built based on office seeking and vote seeking are not strong coalitions, because they are more instantaneous, namely based on short-term interests, not

based on mutually agreed platforms and political party programs. This argument can provide an explanation that conflicts and factionalization that occur in political parties which are the decisions of the elites or party cadres have led political parties to be divided between being supporters of the government or occupying the opposition (Romli 2018).

The domination of the elite within the party circle can anesthetize its constituents, because they have the ability to use various resources to achieve their goals or interests. Then the problem that arises in the development of democracy today must be from which direction to cut the power of elite networks that can create power oligarchy which leads to the decay of democracy. (Mizruchi 2017).

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. Research Approach

The study of factionalization was carried out using a qualitative approach. In this research, the researcher describes how the factionalization occurs. In qualitative research, research reports are described by researchers based on in-depth interviews of several research subjects (Creswell, 2015).

3.2. Types of Research

To understand the internal factionalization that occurred within the Golkar Party, Wonosobo Regency, the researcher used a case study research type, in which the research focused on a unique case that included programs and processes, an organizational and individual event. As is well known, the case study is interpretive in that the emphasis is focused on interpreting the meaning of a social event on a local scale involving various special views, both in terms of local actors and in terms of meaning (Rudestam and Newton, 2007). The case raised in this study is the political factionalization of Golkar in the general election of the President of the Wonosobo Regency with a focus on the study of individual internal variables of Golkar Party cadres and internal variables of the Golkar Party organization.

Then case studies can also be used in several contexts. First, case studies can be used when the objective is to explore a strange or extreme case, such as an extreme organizational change. Second, case studies are used in order to capture characteristics that arise and change in an organization that cannot be captured through a survey because the activity process is too fast. Third, case studies can be used to understand in everyday practice, where everyone involved cannot be explored in a short time. Fourth, case studies can be used in a broad context. Fifth, the case study approach is a technique used to explore informal, confidential, unusual, and forbidden organizational behavior.

In addition, a case study approach is used by considering several things, namely 1) the research is focused on answering the questions of how and why; 2) a researcher cannot manipulate the behavior of all those involved in the research process; 3) a researcher intends to cover up contextual conditions by reason of the researcher's belief that it is relevant to the object under study; 4) there is an unclear boundary between phenomenon and context (Yin 1981).

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Understanding the Occurrence of the Wonosobo Golkar Party's Internal Factionalization

According to Mukhlis (2022), the internal factionalization of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency was motivated by four factors, and these factors did not appear suddenly, but occurred through phases or developments. The factors causing the factionalization are 1) differences of opinion and internal competition in the legislative elections; 2) conflicting interests of the party's internal elite between ideological versus pragmatic orientations; 3) the struggle for positions to obtain party structural positions; 4) conflict of party leadership policies with party policies.

The first factor is the initial phase of factionalization, the authors call it the embryonic phase, which is a phase where the symptoms of factionalization begin to surface in the succession of party leaders and internal competition in legislative elections. The second phase, namely the evolutionary phase, is the phase where factionalization continues to experience significant developments marked by the conflicting interests of the party's internal elite between ideological versus pragmatic orientations and the struggle for positions to obtain party structural positions. The third phase is the split phase (storming). This phase is marked by a clash of party leadership policies with party policies, causing a decrease in the loyalty of party members.

4.1.1. Dynamics of Factionalization in the Embryonic Phase

This phase is a phase in which groups as the forerunners of factions begin to operate within the party's internal side. Differences of opinion in the succession of party leadership became the beginning of debate among party members and cadres so that in the structural environment the party was divided into two groups, namely groups that wanted party leadership succession to be carried out through a voting mechanism and groups that wanted party leadership succession to be carried out by acclamation mechanism. Meanwhile, outside the party management structure, there are groups who want that the succession of party leadership is carried out through a voting mechanism. These three groups maintain their respective opinions which in the next stage these three groups continue to develop and turn into intra-party factions. The group that is in the party structure and wants a mechanism for the succession of party leadership through voting is called the idealist structural faction, and the group that wants the succession of party leadership through the acclamation mechanism is called the pragmatic structural faction. Meanwhile, groups that are outside the party structure and want a mechanism for the succession of party leaders through voting are called cultural factions. These three factions characterize the intra-Golkar Wonosobo party dynamics.

Among the three factions, the pragmatic structural faction is the most dominant faction in the party environment. The acclamation mechanism in the succession of party leaders is also inseparable from the role of pragmatic structural factions that carry out hegemony against idealist structural factions and cultural factions. Hegemony is a way of controlling and perpetuating power through approval or legitimacy, not by means of violence against the party or group that is hegemonized. In interpreting hegemony, Gramsci is more likely to choose a more subtle diction, namely agreement, leadership, soft power, awareness or ideology rather than hard power, as the meaning expressed in the original Greek means domination, with a violent approach. and strength (Cox 1985). However, in the use of Gramsci's theory of hegemony, it is not used as a whole to counter hegemony, but only at the level of the concept of consensus which is the main theme of the idea.

In addition to differences of opinion, in this embryonic phase there is also competition between cadres to get political positions as members of the legislature. In a democratic climate, especially within political parties, competition is a necessity that cannot be avoided. Both political actors and institutions are required to be able to accept the normality of competition in the political world because if competition disappears from the circulation of internal party democracy, it is the same as leading and directing the political system into an absolute authoritarian system. If this is the case, then the truth claim will get free space for the ruling group, and society will only be faced with one choice which is claimed to be the single truth. In fact, there are many issues surrounding the party that require reforms that must be resolved thoroughly.

In a transparent political competition, it is very necessary for the party's journey. because with the competition the institutions and actors involved can evaluate objectively the various policies and activities that have been implemented. In addition, competition is needed as an effort to motivate political parties so that they can do better to get sympathy from the public.

Competition in politics can lead to strategies and innovations in accordance with the wishes of the voters. But the strategy chosen in a short-term transactional competition makes it difficult to convince voters. However, today's political parties have a tendency to think and take instant action and even take shortcuts in pursuit of goals. Almost all political parties seem allergic to take action based on methodological and ethical principles by using political marketing as an effective institution in an effort to gain power.

However, along with changes in the democratic order, the strategies used in competition have also changed. The current trend of democratic development is more towards bourgeois democracy which is characterized by the emergence of various layers and dominant classes from the circle of investors who are able to appear in the struggle for power. This condition has resulted in competition in general elections, especially legislative elections with a competition model based on personality and popularity.

This personality and popularity-based competition has caused factions within the Golkar Wonosobo Party to continue to compete to win figures who come forward and are considered as their representatives for legislative political positions. The pragmatic structural faction, which is more

dominant in the party structure, is so eager to win over the friends of their faction despite friction with their party mates. All the capital owned by the candidates from this faction was mobilized to win the competition.

Likewise, idealist structural factions and cultural factions all struggle to win their faction's friends. Until there came an event where there was friction between candidates from the pragmatic structural faction and the idealist structural faction. This friction occurs as a result of the pattern or campaign strategy played by each candidate and their faction, especially campaigns that use logistics (money). On the one hand, legislative candidates who come from pragmatic structural factions mobilize all their capital resources to win the competition. On the other hand, candidates from the idealist structural faction use more programmatically based campaign patterns. During the campaign, it turned out that the candidate who came from the idealist structural faction found evidence that his fellow legislative candidates who came from the pragmatic structural faction used money politics so that the dynamics between factions became even higher.

The pragmatic structural faction argues that in a competition involving high competition, the mobilization of all available resources is legal and even a must because that is the goal in a political competition is power. Meanwhile, the idealist structural faction states that the mobilization of resources in a competition is legal, but there are limits that should not be crossed as an effort to educate and mature in political life so that candidates and parties as houses still have dignity in front of the community. In addition, the cultural faction has the same view as the idealist structural faction, in their view that political ethics must still be maintained for any reason in a competition.

Indeed, to increase popularity in public, a candidate's personal branding must be built through various efforts that involve significant political costs. In addition to a wide network, credibility, integrity, and modalities must also be owned by a candidate. In the current development of political contestation, for most people money and politics are like rice and side dishes where they complement each other. Politics without money gives birth to the imagination of endless power.

Money and power are considered as two sides of a coin that complement and strengthen each other. Money became a means of gaining power, and power became an important tool for accumulating money. It is a utopian thing if in contemporary political competition the power seekers have no desire to raise money. On the other hand, people who have money and are involved in politics are impossible if they don't want to gain power. It is in this context that there is a correlation between money and power, political parties and money, so that everything can be achieved and maintained. At this point, competition in elections has completely abandoned ideological as the root of a party's strength. A cadre's sense of belonging to the party fades, and on the contrary, the cadre will question the extent to which the party provides something for themselves and their group.

Seeing the political developments that are increasingly prioritizing money as an important capital in the arena of political competition, there are at least four risks that are likely to arise. First, the dominance of money will lead to unhealthy competition between one faction and another (uneven playing field). In this area it is assumed that competition in politics is something that is not sportsmanship and becomes rare when money is only owned and controlled by only a handful of factions so that this will have an impact on limited space for other factions who do not have enough money. Second, the creation of conditions that are discriminatory against representative politics (unequal access to the office). This occurs as a result of the existence of a monopoly of power by factions that have large monetary contributions. Third, the creation of an imbalance relation (unbalanced relationship) between the giver of money and the recipient of the money.

4.1.2. Dynamics of Factionalization in the Evolutionary Phase

This phase is a continuation of the embryonic phase in which the factions continue to operate within the party to achieve their respective goals. The dynamics that occur in this phase can be seen from the conflict of interests of the elite within the party. This conflict of interest can be read from the coalition carried out by the Golkar Party in supporting the presidential candidate pair. Central party administrators form a coalition to obtain power distribution at the central level, provincial party administrators follow the central leadership coalition with the aim of gaining power at the provincial level, and party administrators in the district DPD II who oppose the decision of the central level party because they have interests in the district that are not in line with the interests of the provincial and central levels. From here, the dynamics of each elite occurred until finally all of them left the party orientation which should be ideological in nature.

In the 2019 presidential election, the coalition of political parties was formed not based on ideological factors, but what was more prominent was the influence of party elites and political pragmatism. The party is aimed only at gaining as many votes as possible and is projected to win elections and the ambitions of the elites to come to power. This in political terms is called *cath all party* in which political parties appear with the style and main characteristics of the ideology and platform of the party that is not clear. From this condition, political parties are more directed to the division of seats in government (spoils of office).

Differences in the direction of support occurred within the *Golkar* Party as a result of the decision to form a coalition that was placed on a fragile political commitment so that it did not reflect a complete coalition supported by all party elites. This situation is of course very difficult for the *Golkar* Party to carry out the next political policy that demands internal party solidity so as to avoid divisions in the process of carrying out political missions in providing support for the presidential candidate pair which is full of challenges and dynamics.

The coalition carried out by the *Golkar* Party is ideally based on considerations of the party's vision and mission as well as the orientation of the party to build the country for the welfare of the people so that in the coalition what is displayed are programs that can be carried out in real time in the community which in the next stage the community will also sympathize with the Party. *Golkar* so that between the people and the *Golkar* Party will not be interrupted to provide mutual support in every moment of the general election. In addition, the coalition that is carried out is also not only a decoration that is visible on the surface (live service) and is symbolized by the party elite, but must involve actors or political elites in the region. If all the central and regional elites are solid in the coalition, then there will be no differences in attitudes or behavior between the elites that can lead to internal conflicts within the party, and even further, it can lead to internal party conflicts that can harm the party itself.

The difficulty of the *Golkar* Party in building a solid coalition is also influenced by the various possibilities that occur in political developments when deciding to form a coalition between supporting the existing government or positioning itself as a party that is critical of government policies in accordance with its function as an organization that is required to be able to aggregate interests. society in accordance with its ideology and platform, namely for the welfare of the people.

At the most crucial point, the party's solidity has weakened due to a shift in the orientation of the *Golkar* Party which does not have consistency and fixed beliefs whether it remains in the ideological party circle or shifts to a pragmatic party. This condition is called political nomadism, where ideology and belief in the party are only used as a stopover to fight for and realize the interests of individuals and groups, not the interests of the nation and state. It is in this context that nomadism is continuously institutionalized and is getting stronger and stronger so that the *Golkar* Party becomes trapped in a band of pragmatism that can harm the *Golkar* Party itself in its future journey (Piliang, 2005).

In political nomadism, in it there are various political maneuvers, steps, and strategies to be realized to achieve political victory in which the party continuously creates various forms of inconsistency, ambivalence, paradoxes, and contradictions in politics that always direct and lead various actions or actions. dualistic attitudes, including ways of thinking and acting, which if carried out continuously will lead to absurdities in politics, even though there is no prohibition against the party's actions.

Nomadism as a behavior turns out to be in tandem with the opportunist character of the party in that it provides support for the government not because of awareness to fight for the interests of the people but is only based on the party's temporary interests through a political image that is driven by the electoral and political market. It is in this context that the existing party elite continues to play a role which ultimately has a strong influence on the system.

This is where the conflict between the elite *Golkar* Party at the central, provincial and district levels occurs. *Golkar* Party elites at the district level see that the support given by the *Golkar* Party is more directed at pursuing elite seats at the central level and occupying other strategic positions that benefit the elite at the central level, as well as the provincial level *Golkar* Party elites getting guarantees or political access to power. at the provincial level. Meanwhile, Wonosobo's *Golkar* Party elite feels that they will get nothing even if they support the candidate pair supported by the central level *Golkar*

Party. Therefore, some of the elite of the Golkar Party in Wonosobo took a step that was more independent and more profitable for the party elite in the future, namely joining and supporting the presidential candidate pair who were closer sociologically and psychologically.

The closeness of the Golkar Party elite in Wonosobo with the Gerindra Party elite is considered to be more advantageous, especially for the Golkar Party leadership in Wonosobo Regency so that they try to be determined to get out of the party's internal policy line even though they will face quite heavy risks as a consequence of their political behavior in the presidential election.

This advantage leads to a coalition event in the 2020 Wonosobo Regency regional head election where it is very likely that the Golkar Party in a coalition with the Gerindra Party in the regional head election will be the winner in the election so that most of the elite within the Wonosobo Golkar Party are moved to trying to maneuver politically by going against the internal policies of his own party.

The independence and initiative of some of the elite Wonosobo Golkar Party is considered to have disrupted and hampered party policies by the party leadership at the central level so that the conflict has become a separate dynamic for the journey of the Golkar Party in the presidential election arena. The implication of the existence of a conflict of elite interests is that party ideology is neglected so that the party loses its direction in determining its steps forward. Even though the current Golkar Party still survives in the arena of national political competition, if this kind of political behavior continues to be maintained it will have an impact on public trust where the bond between the Golkar Party and voters at every moment of the general election will cause greater volatility and the party will be more difficult to develop and remain lasting is at the stern of political pragmatism.

Conflicts or conflicts that occur at the elite level as stated by Michels are more due to a fierce competition in the struggle for influence and power so that the struggles that occur between party elites have led to the birth of motivation to take effective and active actions in order to paralyze opponents in the circle. party (Drochon 2020).

4.1.3. Dynamics of Factionalization in the Storming Phase

This phase is a very crucial phase for the internal Wonosobo Golkar Party. The emergence of party leadership policies that are contradictory to party policies is the main trigger for increasing internal dynamics. The policy is in the form of instructions from party leaders to support candidates who are not ordered by the party. From this condition, the reaction between the factions was equally strong. The pragmatic structural faction as a faction close to the party leadership approved and supported the policy steps of the party leadership. Meanwhile, idealist structural factions and cultural factions opposed this policy. As a result of this policy, the loyalty of cadres and members to the party is split.

At the lower level, there is also a dynamic between Golkar Party loyalists and pragmatic structural factions where Golkar Party loyalists feel disappointed with the party leadership's policies which are considered to have deviated from party policies at the central level. This resulted in the loss of enthusiasm for the Golkar Party loyalists to campaign for the voters. The three internal factions of the Golkar Party operate independently according to their own will. That who is elected in the presidential election is determined by their own will.

In a tense atmosphere within the party, all Golkar Party cadres seemed to have lost their direction and the captains to run the organization because there was nothing that could be used as a guide in determining political direction and steps. Although the two factions, namely the idealist structural faction and the cultural faction, followed the guidelines from the regional and central level administrators according to the decision of the party's *Rapimnas*, these two factions had difficulties in internal coordination at the local level. Even because some of the cadres were disappointed with the party leadership's policies, they made their way directly to the central level administrators to coordinate.

The internal Wonosobo Golkar Party is really faced with a difficult position. On the one hand they want to step up to grow the party, but on the other hand they are also held hostage by the policies issued by the party leadership. However, the cultural faction is the faction that strongly opposes the policy. They are of the view that even though there are no party leaders in the regions, they are still obedient and obedient to party policies at the central level. It is different for the pragmatic structural faction as a strong loyalist to the party leadership, they are of the view that the ones who know and

understand the conditions of the local needs the most are the internal parties at the local level, so even if they have to disagree with the administrators at the central level it will not be a problem, because they believe that the policies adopted by them are not a problem. has been taken by the party leadership in the region is the best step to meet the needs of the region itself.

Structural factions and cultural factions assume that the policy steps taken by the party leadership are political motivations based on the desire for power ambitions so as to sacrifice the interests of all party members and cadres for individual and group interests. This assumption is refuted by the pragmatic structural faction. As cadres and party members who have long walked the path in the political world, when viewing and responding to an internal party policy, it must be responded to with a mature attitude, because there are various external factors that influence why the policy is taken. The pragmatic structural faction considers that the cultural faction and the idealist structural faction do not understand the problem of the Golkar Party as a whole, so when there is a policy, they immediately act antipathy and reactive.

In addition, the dynamics that occur have also led to an attitude of cornering each other between factions. The idealist structural faction and the cultural faction consider that the impact of the party leadership's policies has spread to the areas of vote acquisition in the legislative general election. The unequal gains of the Wonosobo Golkar Party in various electoral districts are seen as the impact and the most responsible is the pragmatic structural faction because it has sided with the leadership party. Meanwhile, the pragmatic structural faction considers that the high and low votes are a shared responsibility, and no party should be blamed. This faction is of the opinion that there is no guarantee among all cadres that certain cadres and groups from the most meritorious and most persistent in working to advance and enlarge the party.

One more thing that made the internal Golkar Party more volatile was that after the dismissal of the party leader who had issued a policy that contradicted the party, at the next Regional Deliberation (Musda), the leader was re-elected as Chairman of the Wonosobo Golkar Party DPD II. For the pragmatic structural faction, this is proof that the party leader is a reliable person, with integrity, and full of calculations in making a policy. Even if there is a discrepancy with the central leadership, it is only due to differences in interests that already exist and are common in the political world.

Meanwhile, for the idealist structural faction and the cultural faction, the reappearance of party leaders who have contradicted themselves in making policies is something that is ironic in party life. Although the two factions realized that the choice was due to other factors that could not be explained vulgarly, one of them was the strength of their capital. For those who are in the circle of idealist structural factions and cultural factions, they stay in the Golkar Party not because they agree with the party leadership that was re-elected, but because their inner ties with the Golkar Party cannot be separated anymore, in fact it has been passed down from generation to generation. they are in the Golkar Party. Whoever the leader is, the important thing is the Golkar Party.

In the end, the loyalty contained in a person will decrease when faced with things such as emotional, rational, and personal things. Emotional factors are closely related to matters relating to self-expression and feelings of members or cadres in organizations such as a non-conductive organizational environment, incompatibility between members or with party leaders, and lack of appreciation for the achievements of party members. Then the factor that can reduce the loyalty of party members is the rationality of the party members themselves.

4.2. Understanding the forms of Internal factionalization of the Wonosobo Golkar Party

To see the forms of factionalization that exist within the Golkar Party in Wonosobo Regency, it can be analyzed using Boucek's factionalization theory which categorizes factions into three forms, namely cooperative, competitive, and degenerative.

The factional structure has the potential to increase the aggregate capacity of political parties to facilitate centripetal intra-party cooperation and incentives. By providing a structure for cooperation among the separate groups within the party, factionalization can diversify the party's appeal and accelerate party integration. As far as the factions articulate the opinions and policy preferences of separate community groups and mobilize separate membership as well, as well as community interests in one organization, it is certain that they can play a constructive role in building communication with all parties in an integrated manner.

Cooperative factionalization can take a bipartisan form and be a force to reduce political extremism and facilitate intra- and cross-party cooperation through moderating the attitudes of political leaders. A factional structure may have a role to play in enabling these groups to maintain their identity and membership during consolidation at the party level. In essence, factionalization has the potential for consensus building.

Furthermore, competitive factionalization may offer party leadership long-term management solutions to complex problems over the long term. With the existence of elite circulation, factionalization can revive democratic politics in sub-competitive party systems. However, without adequate security, competition between factions can become excessive and end in division. Therefore, to keep factional pressure under control, leaders need to be aware of this risk and listen to the aspirations of dissenting groups within the party.

Degenerative factions occur when a faction becomes too numerous and self-serving and operates primarily as a channel of distribution of patronage. The resulting privatization of incentives runs the risk of fostering division and triggering a destructive cycle of factionalization that can end in party disintegration that can turn factionalization from a cooperative process into insurmountable competition and ultimately internal party divisions. To overcome this, the key is to maintain harmony within the party.

According to Mukhlis (2022), the form of factionalization that occurred within the *Golkar* Wonosobo Party was a form of cooperative competitive factionalization in which factionalization emerged when there were differences of opinion and internal party competition which was strengthened by the existence of party elite conflicts and the struggle for positions to obtain party structural positions and there is a clash of party leadership policies versus party policies that has caused the division of internal party loyalties.

The factionalization of this cooperative competitive form confirms the existence of strongholds within the party but still provides space for communication between cadres as an effort to dilute the dynamic atmosphere that occurs to advance the party. Even though the clash of opinions and competition is very sharp, all existing factions are still able to refrain from causing internal party divisions. In addition, the internal factionalization of the *Wonosobo Golkar* Party has not been managed properly so that it has a considerable influence on party stability, especially in making decisions within the party's internal circle. The vacancy of the DPD chairman after the removal of Triana Widodo was the result of the weak loyalty of party cadres which led to the strengthening of personal factions based on personal actors.

The change in the factionalization of the *Wonosobo Golkar* Party occurred before and after the 2019 presidential election. Before the general election, the faction was in the form of an unconsolidated interest faction, while after the general election it turned into a personal faction. The consolidated and unconsolidated factions as disclosed by Belloni and Beller (1976) that the unconsolidated factions are also referred to as temporal clique factions. Meanwhile, the consolidated faction is referred to as the personalized faction and can last a long time within the internal party which is strengthened by the presence of a central figure in the party to carry out various political compromises.

The factionalization of the *Wonosobo Golkar* Party which was based on this interest could not come forward directly because all existing factions were in a dilemmatic position between challenging the existing situation and maintaining the organization's existence in the public sphere. The form of cooperative competitive factionalization that is formed on the basis of interests is the simplest form of factionalization that occurs within the *Wonosobo Golkar* Party internally. The character of this faction can be seen from the emergence of various strategic issues that arise but it is not a faction that dominates strongly within the internal party over other factions. Because no one is strong in dominating the internal party, the factions in it do not have a clear hierarchy and structure so they cannot control the public sphere formally.

The *Wonosobo Golkar* Party, which is free from the challenge of internal party divisions, has gone through various efforts from all members and cadres to come up with a consensus on advancing the party by reviving a dialogical culture and adhering to the philosophy of the Javanese proverb, "Ngeli Ning Ora Keli" (Flowing but not carried away). This philosophy is a form of awareness of all internal party stakeholders that can bring the unity of the party to this day.

This adage has been integrated into the daily life of the Javanese people from day to day which contains a very deep philosophy, although some consider it an ordinary joke, but there are also those who consider it as something that reflects an anticipatory attitude towards the symptoms of changes that occur in the surrounding environment. both socially and culturally.

This philosophy can also be interpreted as part of an attitude of prudence that is able to adapt to ongoing situations and conditions and is not constant but experiences dynamics that become a necessity.

Ngeli ning ora keli constructs patterns of thought and patterns of life that have emerged since Javanese society was still in a society that was in the form of a kingdom that has passed and is now present in the form of modern society as a cultural device. The general understanding of the *Ngeli* concept is to flow by following the flow of water which objectively takes place and leads to a meaning that when adjusting to a situation the individual does not drift away and does not lose his identity (Faruk, 2020). This concept is more dominant in the psychological area so that there are elements contained in it subjectively and are not easy to identify. In conditions like this, all individuals realize that there are risks of openness and change.

Based on the concepts that have been obtained from the research findings regarding the factors causing factionalization, namely 1) differences of opinion and internal competition for political positions as members of the legislature; 2) conflicting interests of the party's internal elite between ideological versus pragmatic orientations; 3) the struggle for positions to obtain party structural positions; 4) the conflict of party leadership policies with party policies, then if these concepts are put into a proposition form, it will produce a proposition as follows: "If differences of opinion and competition within the party become sharper, the elite conflict of interest between ideological versus pragmatic orientations will become stronger. , the struggle for positions to obtain structural positions within the internal party is increasing, and if the conflict of party leadership policies with party policies is getting stronger, the opportunities for factionalization will be more open.

Based on the above proposition, this study can build a theory called the "Factionalization Circle Theory." The explanation of this theory is that factionalization occurs because of high individual and group interests, causing disagreements and high competition. Due to differences of opinion and high competition, the conflict between elites becomes high. High elite conflict is caused by fighting over high positions. The struggle for high positions causes conflicting policies that can lead to high internal divisions. The emergence of these policies is due to the pursuit of individual and group interests.

Thus, in this factionalization circle theory, the emphasis is on individual and group interests, meaning that as long as there are individual and group interests within the party, then factionalization will still exist, it's just that the existence of these factions will harm the internal party or not. does not depend on the extent to which the compromise between the factions can provide a sense of comfort for all factions.

5. CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the analysis of the factors causing the factionalization and forms of factionalization of the Wonosobo Regency *Golkar* Party in the 2019 Presidential Election, it can be concluded as follows: (1) the occurrence of internal factionalization of the Wonosobo Regency *Golkar* Party is motivated by several factors and these factors are in phases namely the embryonic phase, the evolutionary phase, and the storming phase. In the embryonic phase, factionalization begins with differences of opinion and internal competition in legislative elections. Then the second phase is the evolutionary phase, where factionalization is getting stronger with the conflict of interests of the party's internal elite between ideological versus pragmatic orientations and the struggle for positions to get party structural positions. The third phase is the storming phase in which the Wonosobo *Golkar* Party is at the door of division. This can be seen from the clash of party leadership policies with party policies, causing division of internal party loyalties; (2) the form of factionalization of the Wonosobo *Golkar* Party is still competitive and cooperative, meaning that the internal factionalization that occurs within the *Golkar* Party of Wonosobo Regency can still be controlled and mediated so that internal party divisions can be avoided even though the dynamics are quite high.

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